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FOREWORD
On December 17, 2014—a date now remembered as D17—President Barack Obama surprised the world 
when he announced the reestablishment of diplomatic 
relations with Cuba and the beginning of a series of policy 
shifts to expand U.S. political, social, economic, and cultural 
engagement with Cuba. The shift in policy has had a lasting 
impact on U.S.-Cuba relations as well as on the experiences 
of Cubans on both sides of the Florida Straits. Since the 
election of Donald Trump as the 45th President of the United 
States, however, a much less sanguine view about the future 
of U.S.-Cuba relations has become the norm. 
The 2018 FIU Cuba Poll is the first one conducted after 
Trump’s inauguration.  Relations between the two countries 
since the last poll have not followed the path of engagement 
established by Obama. While few of the specific policies 
initiated during the presidency of Obama have been 
replaced, the “sonic incidents” reported by U.S. embassy 
personnel in Havana on August 2017, unleashed a series 
of reactions from the Trump administration. The result is the 
current freeze of consular activity in the U.S. Embassy in 
Havana, the creation of a list of hotels and restaurants out 
of bounds for American travelers and the issuing of a travel 
advisory for U.S. travelers to the island. Relations between 
the two countries have become icy at best.  
In the foreword to the previous poll we stated that the 
thawing of relations championed by Obama “had a great 
impact on the way Cuban Americans view the relations 
between the United States and Cuba.”  This year, it is likely 
that the freezing of relations and the intensification of a more 
negative narrative have had a similar impact on the Cuban-
American residents of Miami-Dade County, Florida. 
The findings of the poll suggest that there is a 
retrenchment of traditional hard-line views towards U.S.-
Cuban relations. While political and social engagement is 
still strongly favored, support for the wielding of the “stick” 
of the embargo—the economic isolation of Cuba from the 
U.S. economic relations—has increased among Cuban 
Americans as a whole. The more recent arrivals (after 1995) 
and the second and third generation of Cuban Americans 
are driving the currents of change while more established 
residents insist on a tougher stand.  The retrenchment 
might be driven by the slow pace of change on the island, 
even while the old-guard leadership fades, or by the hostile 
national narrative that currently surrounds U.S.-Cuba 
relations in the United States. Whatever the reason, the 
demographics of the Cuban-American community in South 
Florida continue to change while many of their attitudes 
directed at the state-to-state relations between the U.S. and 
their homeland remain laden with contradictions.  
Various units within Florida International University 
contributed to funding the 2018 FIU Cuba poll. Along with 
the Steven J. Green School of International and Public 
Affairs, these units include the Office of the President, the 
Cuban Research Institute and the Kimberly Green Latin 
American and Caribbean Center. We appreciate their 
generous support of the poll.
Finally, we would like to take this opportunity to once again 
recognize the co-principal investigators, Drs. Guillermo J. 
Grenier and Hugh Gladwin, for more than two decades of 
research and analysis on the public opinions of the Cuban-
American community in South Florida. We would also like to 
acknowledge the collaboration of the staff members of the 
Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs, 
especially Pedro Botta and Amy Ellis.
John F. Stack, Jr., Ph.D. 
Founding Dean
Steven J. Green School 
of International and Public Affairs
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
n The Cuban-American residents of Miami-Dade County 
are evenly split on their views about the U.S. embargo 
of Cuba. Half of the population favors the continuation 
of the embargo and half favors cessation. Opposition 
to the embargo rises to 65% among Cuban Americans 
ages 18 to 39. Similarly, 60% of those arriving since 
1995 oppose continuing the embargo. Among 
registered voters, the same 50-50 split is evident. 
(Figure Cluster 3). The rise in support for the embargo 
is largely due to the apparent shifting of views of the 
pre-1979 cohort. The 1959-1979 migrants increased 
their antagonism to lifting the embargo by over 10% 
points between the 2016 and 2018 polls.
n A majority of respondents favors increasing economic 
relations with the island. The expansion or maintenance 
of the existing business relations receives support from 
68% of the sample. As in most engagement initiatives 
measured in the poll, there is a significant split between 
the views of earlier arrivals (before 1980) and those who 
left Cuba after 1995. The post-1995 migrants, along with 
second and third generations not born on the island, are 
much more likely to support the expansion of business 
ties (55% and 60% respectively—Figure Cluster 4). 
Figure Clusters 5 and 6 present the support for allowing 
U.S. companies to sell food and medicine to Cuba.
n Half of the respondents would allow investment by 
American residents and citizens in the private business 
enterprises emerging in Cuba. The post-1995 migrants 
and those born outside of Cuba are more supportive of 
increasing investment opportunities than the population at 
large (59% and 69% respectively) while pre-1995 cohorts 
are dead set against the idea (Figure Cluster 13).
n A large majority (63%) supported the decision to open 
diplomatic relations with Cuba, with post-1995 arrivals 
and second and third generation Cuban Americans 
strongly backing the Obama era policy shift (75% and 
77% respectively). Support for the reestablishment of 
diplomatic ties maintains a solid majority among all age 
groups up to age 76 and above, after which it drops to 
a 31% support. A majority (61%) of registered voters 
express support while this figure balloons to 77% among 
non-registered voters (Figure Cluster 7).
n A strong majority of respondents (57%) favors the 
lifting of travel restrictions impeding all Americans 
from traveling to Cuba. Unsurprisingly, the newer 
arrivals and those not born on the island lead the 
charge in supporting unrestricted travel (68% and 
69% respectively) while the pre-1980 migrants oppose 
free travel by almost the same proportion (63%). 
Approximately 55% of registered voters also favor 
unrestricted travel by all Americans (Figure Cluster 9). 
n Similarly, 65% of the respondents support the 
continuation of “people-to-people” travel opportunities 
currently endorsed by U.S. policy, with all age cohorts, 
except for the 76 and above cohort, expressing majority 
support. Sixty two percent of registered voters favor the 
policy as well (Figure Cluster 11).
n A majority of respondents agree with the termination 
of the “wet foot/dry foot” immigration policy—52% to 
41%, with 8% unsure of their views. Those coming after 
1980 are lukewarm to the change of policy (only about 
40% support its termination) while those leaving Cuba 
before 1980 and those born outside of Cuba maintain 
a sturdy base of support for its abolition (64% and 55% 
respectively—Figure Cluster 8).
n While the population remains Republican in its voter 
registration (54%), the new arrivals and younger 
voters are fueling the growth of the Independent, or 
what the State of Florida officially labels “no party 
affiliation” registrants (26%). The Republican turnout 
was a significant factor in the midterm elections. 
Approximately 70% of Cuban Americans voted for 
Governor Ron DeSantis, 69% for Senator Rick Scott, 
and 72% percent of the general vote for Congressional 
House Representatives was in support of the Republican 
candidate, even when two of three most significant races 
(Shalala/Salazar and Curbelo/Murcasel-Powell) were 
decided for Democrats.
n When asked to list the issues that influence them to vote 
for a specific candidate, the economy and jobs, health 
care, gun control and taxes topped the list. A candidate’s 
position on Cuba ranked dead last in motivating the 
Cuban-American vote. 
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INTRODUCTION
For those of us engaged in studying the Cuban-American diaspora in South Florida, the last four years have 
resulted in a severe case of cognitive whiplash. The historic 
announcements and policy changes initiated by President 
Obama on December 17, 2014 encouraged the enthusiastic 
reevaluation of business, political and personal relationships 
between the two countries. Organizations of all kinds began 
to envision ways in which to engage Cuba, often discovering 
how difficult it is to do business on the island or, as did the 
airlines, establish unreasonable expectations about the 
benefits of renewed political ties between the two longtime 
ideological adversaries. A coterie of state and municipal 
business leaders from all over the United States rushed to 
Cuba to gauge the depth of the commitment of the Cuban 
authorities to engage in economic as well as political relations 
with the United States.
 Cuban Americans in South Florida too reevaluated 
their future in light of the thawing of relations. Some South 
Floridians began to consider investing in the island’s growing 
private sector. Some longtime residents of the United States 
took the opportunity offered by Cuban law to “repatriate” 
and gain access to the rights of Cuban residents to buy and 
sell property, have access to health care and educational 
opportunities. Eased travel restrictions led to a historic flow of 
non-Cuban Americans to the island. Cubans recalibrated their 
daily routines and calculated how to take advantage of the 
visitors from El Yuma. Some successfully engaged the U.S. 
visitors as efficiently as the U.S. government was attempting 
to engage again with Cuba. 
The Cuban people spontaneously and warmly welcomed 
Obama and his family during his March 20–22, 2016 visit 
and his speech, broadcast throughout the island, was 
broadly hailed in the streets of towns throughout the island 
as an elegant and historic reversal of decades of cold war 
antagonisms and acrimony. The beginning of Obama’s long 
game started off on the right foot. The U.S. was no longer “the 
enemy.” Alternatives to a future with more pluralist options 
seemed possible. 
The snapshot of the South Florida Cuban-American 
community provided by the FIU Cuba Poll conducted 
in August of 2016 captured a sense of optimism and an 
overwhelming support for the Obama initiatives. That was 
then, and this is now. The mood of the community has 
changed in the last two years. President Trump, acting 
as unilaterally as Obama did in opening relations, has 
applied a tourniquet to the flow of goodwill between the 
two countries. This change in the national narrative and 
policy initiatives has had a real impact on the Cuban-
American community represented by our poll. Today, we 
see a retrenchment of traditional positions of isolation rather 
than the anticipation of engagement. We see a community 
divided on the issue of the embargo while still willing to 
maintain and even expand the business relationships 
established as a result of the Obama initiatives. The 
community still wants unrestricted travel to the island, a 
right that Cuban Americans have had for years, to become 
available to all Americans. The new arrivals and second 
and third generation Cuban Americans express a strong 
desire to continue the engagement trends but engaging 
the young and the new arrivals in the political processes 
necessary to institutionalize change is a challenge. 
Large majorities voted for DeSantis and Scott for statewide 
office and the Republican Party holds on to its slight majority 
among registered voters (54%). The Democratic Party is not 
making great inroads but independent voters who sometimes 
behave like Democrats, are growing. And what we discover 
in this poll, perhaps to no one’s surprise, is that Cuban 
Americans, when engaged in politics, are Americans first and 
Cubans second. When asked to list the issues that motivate 
a vote for a specific candidate, American Cubans list as their 
priorities the economy and jobs, health care, gun control. 
The second and third generations include immigration as an 
issue that their parents and grandparents barely register. A 
candidate’s position on Cuba ranks eighth on the list. Puts this 
entire Cuba Poll thing in context, doesn’t it? 
Almost three decades of polling the community has taught 
us a great deal. The Cuban-American population is far from 
homogenous and its heterogeneity spans social, cultural, 
economic, and political dimensions. There are Cubans and 
there are Cubans. The more recent arrivals are poorer, more 
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racially diverse, and, like the second and third generations, 
more inclined to support policies of engagement with the 
island. These more conciliatory voices are expressing their 
desire to promote change just as much as those advocating 
isolationist policies. 
Many of the trends that we have identified in past polls 
remain significant. Those migrants who experienced the 
seismic changes brought about by the 1959 Revolution are 
more likely to express support for the isolationist policies 
codified in U.S. policy toward Cuba. This wave of exiles 
is diminishing in numbers but perhaps not in influence. 
Subsequent waves of immigrants, particularly those 
arriving after the 1995 immigration agreement signed by 
representatives of the two countries, are increasing their 
demographic significance within the community and their 
members express more of a willingness to increase contact 
between Cubans here and there. 
The once almost monolithic control of the Republican 
Party on registered Cuban-American voters is also affected 
by the growing migrant waves. From a dominance of 70% 
in the early 1990s, registered Republicans have declined to 
approximately 54% of the population in the current poll. Yet, 
as the midterm election vote presented in this report shows, 
the earliest arrivals still remain the most loyal and dependable 
of Republican voters. The new arrival waves and the rising 
tide of second and third generation Cuban Americans 
are floating the boats of the Democratic Party and, more 
significantly, the rolls of independents in the region but their 
impact in elections remains uncertain. 
To clarify the trends and changes in the Cuban-American 
population of South Florida, in this poll we divide the 
respondents into three main immigrant waves: before 1980, 
from 1980 to 1994, and from 1995 to the present. We also 
report the results by place of birth (Cuba/U.S.-born), age 
and voter registration status. The last chart in most of the 
key questions views the population in a dichotomous way: 
those arriving before 1979 and all the other migrants as 
well as the second and third generation respondents. Here 
we see the initial opinion divide which is deepening in the 
population between the “exilio historico” and its coattails with 
new migrations that researchers often view as less political 
and more economic in nature. In some questions, we include 
the category of “Don’t Know” to ensure that we do not 
undervalue ambivalence or indecision among respondents. 
Our purpose is to understand, not to obscure, the opinions of 
the surveyed population.
This poll continues the tradition started over two decades 
ago. We remain curious about how the Cuban-American 
community views U.S.-Cuba relations. We are aware of 
the heterogeneity of the community and are becoming 
more accustomed to hearing its many voices. This survey 
shows that members of the Cuban diaspora in Miami-Dade 
County have diverse views about how they would like 
the U.S. government to deal with the Cuban state. Some 
remain convinced that the changes they desire will come 
to Cuba only by isolating it from its diaspora and the U.S. 
government. Some would like to continue at least some 
elements of the new course charted since D17. 
What remains clear is that Cuba inspires debate and 
passions in all Cubans. Those who came to the United 
States immediately after the Revolution comprise an 
increasingly smaller percentage of the population, but 
their influence remains strong even as their ideas are 
transformed and reinterpreted by newer migrants from the 
island. Our poll preserves a record of the continuity and 
change occurring in the Cuban-American community in 
South Florida. It is a record of a transition and tradition as 
dramatic and far-reaching as the transitions occurring on the 
island. This is our South Florida transition and it is happening 
daily, whether a poll is taken to witness its dynamics or 
not. Whatever is to come, it is likely that the South Florida 
Cuban-American community, its newcomers as well as its 
established residents, will have a say in shaping the future of 
Cuba, as well as the future of U.S.-Cuba relations. 
Guillermo J. Grenier, Ph.D.
Professor
Hugh Gladwin, Ph.D.
Associate Professor
Department of Global and Sociocultural Studies
Florida International University
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THE POLLSTERS
Guillermo J. Grenier is Professor of Sociology and 
Chair of  the Department of Global and Sociocultural 
Studies at Florida International University. Born in 
Havana, Cuba, Dr. Grenier is one of the founders 
of the Miami school of social analysis, and has 
authored or coauthored seven books and dozens of 
articles on labor, migration, immigrant incorporation, 
and Cuban-American ideological profiles, 
particularly in the Greater Miami area. His books 
include A History of Little Havana, with Corinna J. 
Moebius (2015); This Land Is Our land: Newcomers 
and Established Residents in Miami, with Alex 
Stepick, Max Castro, and Marvin Dunn (2003); The 
Legacy of Exile: Cubans in the United States, with 
Lisandro Pérez (2002); Newcomers in the Workplace: 
Immigrants and the Restructuring of the U.S. 
Economy, with Louise Lamphere and Alex Stepick 
(1994); and Miami Now! Immigration, Ethnicity, and 
Social Change, edited with Alex Stepick (1992). Dr. 
Grenier has been a Fulbright Fellow and a Faculty 
Fellow of the University of Notre Dame’s Institute 
of Latino Studies, as well as Director of the Florida 
Center for Labor Research and Studies. He lectures 
nationally and internationally on his research. He 
received his Ph.D. in sociology and his M.A. in Latin 
American Studies from the University of New Mexico 
in Albuquerque.
Hugh Gladwin is the past director of the Institute 
for Public Opinion Research and former Associate 
Professor in the Department of Global and 
Sociocultural Studies at Florida International 
University. His major area of research is the 
application of survey research and GIS tools to 
understand large urban settings of high cultural and 
demographic diversity. Within that framework, a 
particular interest is to better model the interactions 
between the human population and natural systems 
such as the South Florida ecosystem and natural 
events like hurricanes and climate change. He is a 
coeditor (with Walter Gillis Peacock and Betty Hearn 
Morrow) and contributor to the book Hurricane 
Andrew: Ethnicity, Gender, and the Sociology of 
Disaster (1997) and author of numerous publications 
and presentations on disaster mitigation, public 
health, and public opinion, especially among Cuban 
Americans. Along with Arthur Heise, he directed 
the FIU/Florida Poll, which tracked public opinion 
statewide from 1988 to 2006. He is a research 
scientist in the Florida Coastal Everglades Long-
Term Ecological Research project (FCE-LTER). 
In Miami-Dade County, Dr. Gladwin serves as a 
member of the Steering Committee of the Local 
Mitigation Strategy and was appointed by the 
County Commission to be on the county Climate 
Change Advisory Task Force. He is also a member 
of the Socioeconomic Working Group of the NOAA 
Hurricane Forecast Improvement Project. He holds a 
Ph.D. in anthropology from Stanford University.
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METHODOLOGICAL NOTE
This survey examines how Cuban-American residents of Miami-Dade County, Florida, view 
current U.S.-Cuba policy. To appraise trends in the community we ask many of the same questions 
we have asked for more than 20 years. We measure support for the embargo as well as changing 
individual interests associated with U.S.-Cuba policy, such as travel restrictions, trade and investment 
opportunities, diplomatic engagement, and U.S. immigration policy. We also measure support for 
political candidates who might be willing to propose changes in the embargo in exchange for policies 
that favor the strengthening of small businesses and human rights on the island. The poll carefully 
documents the respondents’ demographic characteristics and how they relate to their attitudes toward 
U.S.-Cuba relations.
The 2018 FIU Cuba Poll was conducted between November 14 and December 1, 2018. It was 
administered to a random sample of 1,001 Cuban-American residents of Miami-Dade County, ages 18 
and over. The sample was generated from telephone exchanges using standard random-digit-dialing 
procedures to ensure that each phone number has an equal chance of being chosen for the sample. 
Interviews were conducted with respondents either by landline or cell phones (250 by landline, 751 
by cell phone). Bilingual interviewers conducted the survey in Spanish and English, depending on the 
respondents’ preference (69% of the interviews were completed in Spanish). The countywide margin of 
error is plus or minus 3.1% at the 95% confidence level. 
The poll carefully documents 
the respondents’ demographic 
characteristics and how they  
relate to their attitudes toward  
U.S.-Cuba relations. 
Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs  7   
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The answer to this question, which we have been asking first for over 20 years, rather than being an off-the-cuff response, always seems to 
be a result of the mood of the times. In the 2016 poll, 15% felt that changes were occurring or would occur within one year. This optimism has 
been bumped down a year in the current poll as an increased number estimated a 2-5-year time horizon for major political changes to occur. 
Frustrated pessimism has increased by 4% as well (the Never category), slightly above the margin of error of both polls. Some patterns remain 
the same, however, as the earlier arrivals express more pessimism and the more recent arrivals more optimism. Nearly half, 46% of pre-1980 
migrants, said that changes would never occur, as did 57% of the 1980–94 cohort and 41% of the post-1995 cohorts. The most optimistic 
respondents were the second and third generation respondents. About 14% of these respondents believe that changes are occurring now 
or will within one year and 18% are keeping an eye on political change occurring within the next 2-5 years. Younger cohorts are consistently 
more optimistic than older Cuban Americans who have been to this rodeo before.
This section presents the responses to key questions of the poll. The exact wording for selected questions, along with the 
Spanish version, is included in Appendix 2.
Anticipating More Changes
When asked when major political changes were likely to occur in Cuba, 38% of 
respondents said that changes would never occur in Cuba, while 12% believe that 
changes are occurring now or will within one year.
MAIN FINDINGS
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Over 80% of Cubans living in Miami-Dade County believe the embargo 
has not worked.
The Embargo and Economic Relations
In general terms, the community is of two minds when it comes to engaging in economic relations with the island. On one hand, they 
support the existing business relationships established during the Obama period. At the same time, there is a strong retrenchment of support 
for the embargo—the primary policy in place to isolate the Cuban government from U.S. economic activity. This is the case even when, as 
has always been the case, the ineffectiveness of the embargo has risen to the level of a truism. We will hold off interpreting this most Cuban-
American of contradictions but it is clear that the concepts of the “carrot and the stick” have a safe haven in the Cuban-American psyche. 
Figure Cluster 2
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The population is evenly split: 51% support the continuation of the embargo and 49% oppose its 
continuity. If the respondents expressing ambiguity about their support are included, the population 
remains split but 11% can be interpreted as being “undecided” in their decision. 
As the graph reporting the responses by migration and birth makes evident, there is a clear grouping 
of proponents and opponents of the embargo.  Pre-1995 migrants are more enthusiastic about 
wielding the economic stick of the embargo while the post-1995 migrants and second and third 
generation Cuban Americans are less enamored with the policy. Younger Cuban Americans ages 
18 to 39 are the most adamant opponents of the embargo (65%). Approximately 52% of registered 
voters support the maintenance of the embargo while an equal number (53%) of non-registered 
voters support its elimination. 
The last figure highlights the division between the pre-1979 Cuban Americans and the 
subsequent populations of migrants and those born outside Cuba. While 68% of pre-1959 
migrants support the embargo, 56% of other Cuban Americans are in favor of its removal. As we 
explain in the discussion section, when we compare the attitudes towards the embargo expressed by the pre-1980 migrants in the 2016 FIU Cuba Poll 
with the current responses, we can see that the shift towards a “harder line” on the embargo is led by these respondents. The pre-1980 migrants in 
the 2016 poll supported the embargo by 57%. In the 2018 measurement of this opinion, this same cohort supports the embargo by 68%. Meanwhile, 
the “Other Cuban Americans,” i.e. those who migrated after 1980 or were born outside of Cuba, maintained steady support for the embargo (45.2% in 
2016 and 44.5% in 2018). (See Figure 20.a)
The Cuban-American community is evenly split on its opinion about the  
maintenance or abolition of the economic embargo against Cuba. The pre-1980 
migrants lead the opposition to lifting the embargo.
The Embargo and Economic Relations
Figure Cluster 3
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Most respondents favor expanding or maintaining the economic  
relations between companies in the United States and the island.
A majority of Cuban Americans in Miami-Dade County (68%) support the expansion or 
maintenance of business relations with Cuba by U.S. companies. Newer arrivals do so in 
overwhelmingly greater numbers than pre-1980 arrivals (60% of the former want an expansion 
of economic relations while only 25% of the latter do) and younger respondents are more 
supportive than older respondents. Approximately 66% of registered voters support a 
maintenance or expansion of economic relations and an impressive 80% of non-registered 
voters do the same.  The divide between the pre-1979 migrants and other Cuban Americans is a 
perfect dichotomy, as can be seen in Figure 4.e.
As has been the case for many years, an overwhelming majority of the respondents endorse 
the selling of food (70%) and medicine (75%) (See Figure Clusters 5 and 6).
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Seventy percent support the sale of food products  
to Cuba by U.S. companies
The Embargo and Economic Relations
Figure Cluster 5
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Seventy five percent support the sale of medical items 
to Cuba by U.S. companies.
Figure Cluster 6
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While the Trump administration has altered very few of the Obama initiatives, a dramatic shift in the tone of the relations between the two 
countries has occurred. The national narrative towards Cuba is one of hostility rather than engagement; confrontation rather than negotiation. 
According to the administration, Cuba has conducted an unspecified, high tech “sonic attack” on U.S. Embassy personnel in Havana. The 
categorization of the event as an “attack,” rather than a public health concern, along with the lack of information available about the nature 
of the incident, justified placing a travel warning on the country to advise travelers of the apparent random risks that they face if they chose 
to exercise their limited rights to travel to Cuba. Also justified is the reduction of embassy personnel in Havana to the point where consular 
activities are inactive. The travel ban had a chilling effect on U.S. travelers to Cuba and the embassy reductions have had a dramatic impact 
on Cubans traveling to the United States. Cubans requesting visas to visit relatives in the United States must travel to U.S. embassies in a 
third country to make an appointment for visa applications. It is in this climate that the Cuban-American diplomatic relations slouch towards 
some unknown Bethlehem where they will be reshaped into a more hostile, or more hopeful, mold. It is in this climate that our respondents 
express their views on diplomatic relations between the two countries.
Policy Changes and Continuity
Sixty-three percent of Cubans living in Miami-Dade County expressed support for 
the establishment of diplomatic relations with Cuba.
While there seems to be a retrenchment of attitudes towards the embargo 
as an economic pressure point to bring about change, Cuban Americans 
are also in favor of maintaining political connections to the island. A strong 
majority are in favor of the establishment of diplomatic relations. This number is 
unchanged (within the margin of error) from the 2016 measure of 65% support. 
Younger Cuban Americans are more supportive than older Cuban Americans, 
and the newest arrivals are more in favor than the pre-1980 cohort (75% to 
41% respectively). Respondents not born in Cuba are strong supporters of 
diplomatic relations (77%).  Approximately 61% of registered voters are in 
favor of diplomatic relations policies while 77% of those not registered to vote 
are in support. The split between the pre-1979 and other Cuban Americans is 
pronounced (see Figure 7.e).
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Fifty-two percent of Cubans in Miami-Dade County support the termination 
of the “wet foot/dry foot” policy.
The population is evenly split on its support for the termination of the wet foot/dry foot policy but only the pre-1980 migrants and the 
second and third generations are significantly in favor of the abolition of this policy codified in the 1995 immigration agreement and terminated 
by Obama in January 2017.  All age cohorts support the end to the special treatment of Cubans. Fifty-five percent of registered voters support 
the policy shift.  Figure 8.e highlights the divide between pre-1979 migrants and other Cuban Americans.
Figure Cluster 8
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Policy Changes and Continuity
Fifty-seven percent of the respondents favor unrestricted travel by all 
Americans to Cuba.
When asked if unrestricted travel by all Americans to Cuba should be allowed or not, 57% of the respondents answered affirmatively. The 
support for unrestricted travel is weakest among the pre-1980 cohort (37%) and strongest among the post-1995 cohort (68%) and those not 
born on the island (69%). A majority of respondents in all age cohorts support opening up travel, except for the 76 and above group (49%). 
A majority (55%) of registered voters endorse this type of policy initiative. Figure 9.e presents the almost perfect asymmetry between the 
opinions of pre-1979 arrivals and other Cubans.
Figure Cluster 9
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Most of the Cuban origin population has not traveled to the island but the 
newer arrivals continue to maintain linkages with family and communities 
back home.
Cuban Americans with ties to the island continue to exercise their privileged position of being able to travel to the island whenever they 
wish. While a large minority, 43%, of Cuban Americans in South Florida have traveled to the island, either since their migration or as second or 
third generation Cuban Americans, a whopping 75% of post-1995 arrivals have returned for a visit.
Figure Cluster 10
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Policy Changes and Continuity
Sixty-five percent of the respondents support the continuation of “people-to-
people” programs.
A large majority of respondents favor the continuation of “people-to-people” travel opportunities currently endorsed by U.S. policy. The 
post-1995 arrivals do so overwhelmingly (92%) with a majority of all age cohorts, except the oldest, expressing their support. Strong support 
exists in the population regardless of place of birth. Sixty-nine percent of registered voters favor the policy as well. Figure 11.e highlights the 
significant difference between the pre-1979 migrants and other Cuban Americans.
Figure Cluster 11
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Forty percent of Cuban Americans in Miami-Dade report sending money to friends 
or relatives on the island and 36% report sending other items. Forty-five percent of 
respondents who send remittances report sending to the province of Havana.
Approximately 72% of the post-1995 cohort report sending money to relatives or friends on the island, while only 26% of 1995 migrants and 
44% of 1980-1994 migrants do. A majority of respondents 59 years old or younger send money while only a third of those 60 and over send 
remittances. A quarter of respondents not born on the island send remittances (26%). Respondents who are registered to vote are just as likely 
to send money remittances as non-registered respondents. Approximately 8% of respondents believe that some of the money or items they 
have sent to the island has been used to assist in the development of private small business in Cuba.  Havana is overwhelmingly the recipient of 
remittances (45%), with no other province receiving more than 8% of the remittances (Pinar del Rio, 8%).
Figure Cluster 12
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Policy Changes and Continuity
Half of the respondents would allow people living in the United States to invest in 
small businesses in Cuba.
Support for investment options shows a marked decrease from the responses recorded in the 2016 Cuba Poll (57% support) but 
remains on an upward trend compared to the 2014 measure (14%). The more recent cohorts are the most supportive of the liberalization 
of investment opportunities; 31.6% of pre-1995 arrivals express support while 58.6% of post-1995 arrivals express support. Sixty-nine 
percent of respondents not born on the island support opening up investment opportunities. The proportional split is reflected within the 
ranks of the registered voters, where 49% report supporting a more liberal investment policy.  The unregistered respondents are more 
enthusiastic (57%). Figure 13.e presents evidence that Cuban Americans not arriving in the pre-1979 period are more willing to allow all 
Americans to invest in Cuba.
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Forty-six percent of Cuban Americans supporting investment on the  
island would invest in a private enterprise in Cuba.
Pre-1980 arrivals pronounce a resounding “no” to personal investments on the island (66%) while members of the two other waves are more 
likely to invest. Only second and third generation Cuban Americans appreciate the opportunity in the majority (57%).   About half of Cuban 
Americans not members of the pre-1979 cohort are willing to risk investing in Cuba if given the opportunity (Figure 14.e).
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Politics
Fifty-four percent of respondents are registered Republicans, 19% are Democrats, 
and 26% are Independent.
The new arrivals are more evenly split between the three political preferences; 36% are Republican, 25% Democrat, and 38% are 
Independent. A strong majority of pre-1980 and 1980–94 arrivals are Republicans (72% and 64%). An impressive 40% of 18–39 year-olds 
report being Independents. Figure 5.d makes clear that a slim majority other Cuban Americans (52%) are either Independent or Democrat. 
The Republican Party maintains its 70% dominance in the pre-1979 cohort. 
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Cuban Americans register and exercise their rights to vote. Of the 88% citizens in 
the sample, 95% are registered to vote, and 87% reported  
voting in the midterm election.
The 2018 midterm election motivated the Cuban voter. Even with the expected lower participation by the new arrivals (only 65% are citizens) 
and the apathy usually associated with the less engaged younger voters (they surprised with 78% turnout), this election cycle turned out the 
Cuban-American vote. We will present the votes in the major races in the next section, but the sample suggests that the Cuban-American new 
arrivals are becoming incorporated into the political activities of their new nation, after years of resisting involvement. The 2016 FIU Cuba Poll 
indicated that 53% of 1995-2016 migrants had received U.S. citizenship. Using the same measure (including all migrants arriving during 1995-
to date of the poll), the number of citizens has increased in this poll to 65%.
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Politics
Yes, Virginia. Cubans still vote Republican. The majority of Cuban Americans cast 
their vote in support of Ron DeSantis for Governor and Rick Scott for Senate. 
The massive turnout evident in the reported figures benefited both Republican and Democratic candidates in a year of tight elections but 
Republicans received the biggest election “pastelito” from Cuban-American voters. 
Seventy percent of Cuban Americans voted for Republican Ron DeSantis. All migration categories went for DeSantis, with the 1995-2018 
cohort giving Democrat Andrew Gillum a 35% boost. The second and third generation Cuban Americans made it a horse race, favoring DeSantis 
with 51% of the vote to Gillum’s 48%. A similar reflection of the youth vote turning out for Gillum can be seen in the age breakdown (Figure 17.c).
The results in the Senate race were nearly identical. Scott received 69% of the Cuban-American vote and Nelson received 30%. In 
both races women were more likely to vote Democratic than men, as were the younger voters and the second and third generation Cuban 
Americans. At the end of the day, however, Republican voters turn out and make a difference. Figure 17.e shows that the pre-1979 cohort 
voted overwhelmingly for DeSantis (84%), the “Other Cuban Americans” did not disappoint the Republican candidate who received 65% of 
their vote. Nearly identical proportions gave their vote to Rick Scott in his tight race with Bill Nelson (Figure 17.j).
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The Congressional vote patterns maintain the heavy Republican profile, as shown in Figure Cluster 18.  The overview table of the entire 
sample is interesting in its distribution, but it should not be confused with an accurate percentage of the vote received by each candidate 
in individual races within their districts. The respondents who voted for Maria Elvira Salazar could have voted for Donna Shalala but not for 
Mario Diaz-Balart. Further analysis is required to match up the geography of the voters with the races available to them (we did not ask for 
the respondent’s Congressional District) as well as deconstructing the “partisan” vote of the voters who reported that they just voted for “the 
Republican” or “the Democrat.”  It is clear, however, that the Cuban American vote went for Maria Elvira Salazar, Mario Diaz-Balart and Carlos 
Curbelo, even if two of the three lost their races to their rivals.  
The second set of tables breaks down the votes by the party receiving them (Democrat/Republican) to see how the Congressional vote 
was dispersed by age, migration wave and birth and gender.  The distribution of the total sample is presented in the pie chart. Approximately 
72% of the voters cast a ballot for the Republican candidate in their district. The groups most likely to muster a Democratic resistance are the 
second and third generation Cuban Americans and women. A third of the women’s vote went to Democratic Congressional candidates. Cuban 
Americans not arriving before 1979 voted for the Republican candidate with diminished but significant zeal, compared to the pre-1979 cohort 
(65%-83%- Figure 18.e).
 
Congressional Vote Pattern
Figure Cluster 18
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Voting While Cuban: Cuban Americans or American Cubans?
Figure Cluster 19
When asked what issues motivate them to cast their vote for a specific candidate, 
Cuba ranked 8th on the list. Most Cuban Americans are concerned about the same 
issues that non-Cubans and other Latinos are concerned about: health care and 
the well being of the economy.
The FIU Cuba Poll emphasizes the attitudes of the Cuban-American community towards U.S.-Cuba policy. We have often asked our 
respondents the importance of a candidate’s position on Cuba in shaping their voting behavior and have always received tepid responses. 
This year we asked respondents to tell us the one or two “issues that may have been important to you in your deciding who to vote for in the 
election.” What are the issues that motivate Cuban Americans to vote for a specific candidate? The responses, perhaps unsurprising to most, 
clearly reverse the nature of the hyphenated identity of Cuban Americans when it comes to politics.  Cubans are embedded in the American 
socio-political system and as such receive much of the same information as other citizens on which to base their vote during the political 
season. They are American Cubans and weigh the issues facing the country much like other differently hyphenated Americans. 
The top five issues for Cuban Americans, the issues that motivates their vote for a specific candidate, are 1) the economy and jobs, 2) health 
care, 3) gun control 4) immigration a sometimes distant fourth and 5) taxes/government spending. The top two jockey for position depending 
on the category being highlighted but the economy and health care never relinquish their grip on the first two spots. Democrats emphasize 
health care while Republicans highlight the importance of the economy and jobs. Independents, mostly new arrivals and young, focus on the 
economy as well.  Grouping “taxes and spending” with “economy and jobs,” given their economic nature, would give financial concerns the 
top spot easily. The issue of immigration rises to significance only among the second and third generation, younger voters and the 60-75 age 
group.  The candidate’s position on Cuba comes in dead last.
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Voting While Cuban: Cuban Americans or American Cubans?
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SELECTED TRENDS
This section presents a comparison of the responses to key questions from 
this poll with our previous polls. 
How this Poll Compares to Previous FIU Cuba Polls
Support for the embargo has steadily decreased within the Cuban-American population in the Miami area. During the 1990s, the 
five polls we conducted tabulated an average of 84% support for maintaining the embargo. Since 2000 to the present, the average 
support for the embargo over the last eight polls has diminished to approximately 55%. This decline could largely be explained by the 
incorporation of post-1995 migrants into the population. Figure 20 presents the numbers.
The apparent increase in support for the embargo is a striking feature of this edition of the FIU Cuba Poll. It is difficult to pinpoint a 
single reason for this but by comparing the 2016 poll with the current poll in more detail, we observe an important dynamic at work: the 
pre-1979 cohort seems to have changed its mind.  As Figure 20a shows, there was an insignificant change in the attitudes of “Other 
Cuban Americans” towards the embargo between 2016 and 2018, according to the polls. What changed significantly was the attitude of 
the 1959-1979 migrants, increasing their endorsement of the embargo by over 10%. While only a part of the story, comparing the polls 
shows the subtlety and fragility of opinions and their measurements.
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Support for Unrestricted Travel
Political Party Registration
Lifting the restrictions on travel to Cuba for all Americans has received increasing support over the years. The five surveys conducted in the 
1990s averaged 43% support for lifting travel restrictions, while the eight post-2000 surveys averaged 60% support. The dramatic increase 
between the 1997 poll and the 2000 poll indicates that the opinions of the post-1995 migrants made a difference on this issue.
Although still a majority among Cuban-American voters in Miami, Republican Party registrations have declined over the years while 
Independents and Democrats have increased. The largest gains have been within the ranks of the Independent voters, which represented over 
a quarter of the registered voters in the 2018 poll. 
Support for Allowing Unlimited Travel by All Americans
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DISCUSSION AND  
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The major conclusion drawn from this poll is that many Cuban 
Americans in Miami-Dade County, particularly those that left 
Cuba before 1979, are reevaluating their engagement attitudes. 
It is likely that the reevaluation is influenced by the dramatic 
change in the narrative towards Cuba adopted by the Trump 
administration. If this is the case, Cuban Americans are not so 
much shaping as reflecting U.S. foreign policy towards Cuba. 
Another social force potentially shaping the general shift in 
attitudes is the unmet expectations, particularly by the pre-1980 
migrants, of what a post-Fidel/post-Castro Cuba might look 
like. After decades of waiting morbidly for the demise of the 
revolutionary leader, the changes that ensued after his death 
on November 25, 2016—three months after we conducted the 
previous FIU Cuba Poll—have been tempered. The initiatives 
undertaken by Raul Castro when he assumed definitive control 
of the government in February 2008 generally have been 
maintained. The new President of Cuba, Miguel Diaz-Canel 
has, to date, stayed the course, as far as the old guard Cuban-
American community can tell. The Obama policy innovations and 
the grand expectations of change which accompanied them have 
not delivered any results, according to many Cuban Americans. 
Contributing to the deflation of the engagement bubble is the 
rising hostility against normalizing relations between the two 
countries by the Trump administration. The Cuban-American 
population is not immune to the national narratives. It is part of 
this society and, as much as Cuba remains a source of identity 
and pride, the members of the community are embedded 
in the socio-political structure of this society and this South 
Florida, where all Cuba news is magnified, and its importance 
often overblown to benefit broader political agendas. The 
negative national narrative, plus the measured pace of 
changes taking place on the island, combine to create a less 
than hopeful view of the future and a more ambivalent attitude 
about the way forward. These are possible explanations for 
the shifting attitudes. More analysis is required to make more 
definitive statements.
Cuban Americans continue to welcome and support many of 
the changes in U.S. policy since December 2014, such as travel, 
the maintenance or expansion of limited economic relations 
and the willingness to allow U.S. citizens to invest in Cuban 
businesses. Yet, there is a retrenchment of old less conciliatory 
positions by the old, less conciliatory segments of the community. 
The major measure of this is the 50/50 split on support for the 
embargo. As the trend charts make clear, we have to go back to 
the 2011 poll to see a similar division in the community. 
By comparing the results of the current poll with the high 
optimism for engagement measured in the 2016 poll, we see 
that the shift reflects a major realignment of the attitudes of 
the earlier, pre-1979 migrants. (See Figure 20.a). In 2016, the 
poll, which measured an overwhelming support for lifting the 
embargo, 45.2% of Cuban Americans not members of the pre-
Mariel migration group favored continuation of the embargo. 
This same category of Cuban American in our current poll 
support the embargo by 44.5%; an insignificant change in 
attitude. Meanwhile, the 1959-1979 migrant cohort expressed, 
in 2016, a 57.2% support for continuing the embargo. This same 
group of Cuban Americans in this poll report 68.4% support for 
the embargo; a significant increase of over 10% points.
In the midst of this seeming rebuke of engagement by an 
important segment of our community, many Cuban Americans 
continue to welcome and support many of the changes in U.S. 
policy since December 2014, such as travel, the maintenance 
or expansion of limited economic relations and the willingness 
to allow U.S. citizens to invest in Cuban businesses. There are 
persistent patterns that continue to signal change and point 
towards a continuation of a demographic and ideological 
transition—from one dominated by an exile agenda to one 
dominated by immigrants along with second and third 
generation Cuban Americans. The poll continues to highlight the 
various dimensions of the changes based on migrant wave and 
generational shifts fueled by continued migration from the island 
and the rising number of Cuban Americans born in the United 
States. Both of these groups—new arrivals and second/third 
generations—are more likely to view the U.S. policies developed 
during the Cold War less favorably than the earlier arrivals. 
 Older respondents and those leaving Cuba before 1980 
as an aggregate are much more committed to the isolation 
of Cuba from U.S. citizens and businesses. The more recent 
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arrivals and new generations of Cuban Americans are much 
more likely to view engagement policies as the best form of 
bringing about change in Cuba. Many are personally engaged 
with contemporary Cuban society, especially by traveling to visit 
friends and relatives, sending remittances, fueling private sector 
investment, and desiring to do more, not less, on the island.
The mass migration of Cubans to Florida and the United 
States has been put on hold by the termination of the wet-foot/
dry-foot policy and the suspension of consular services at the 
Embassy in Havana. As recent arrivals become integrated into 
the democratic processes of their adopted country, voices 
for changing the current policy become louder. While there 
seems to be an uptick in citizenship and voter registration 
activity among the new arrivals, it is difficult to predict how fast 
additional policy changes will occur.
The data presented in the current poll have significant  
policy implications:
1The split on support for the embargo signals a division in the population.  
 Younger Cuban Americans are more likely to oppose the 
embargo (65%). Cuban Americans not born in Cuba also 
support lifting the embargo (60%) as do post-1995 migrants 
(60%). This suggests that support for the embargo will 
decrease with the growth of second and third generation Cuban 
Americans and continued immigration from the island. The 
population of registered voters is also split, 48% to 52% of those 
expressing an opinion, in favor of maintaining the embargo. 
The schism occurs between pre- and post-Mariel cohorts. 
The former’s reevaluation of engagement policies is the single 
strongest factor for the shift measured in the entire population.
2While holding the embargo in place has the support of 50% of the populations, there is 
also support for allowing contacts with non-
Cuban Americans. 
Cuban Americans express dedicated support for policies that 
increase contact between all U.S. residents/citizens, and the 
Cuban people. Lifting the travel restrictions currently in place 
for non-Cuban-American citizens receives strong backing by 
the entire sample 57%, as well as among new arrivals and the 
second and third generation voters (68% and 69%) and 55% of 
registered voters. The continuation of “people-to-people” travel 
also receives strong support.
3Cuban Americans express support for measures that maintain or increase 
commercial relations between U.S. businesses 
and Cubans. 
As in previous polls, support for companies selling medicine 
and food spans all cohorts. Similarly, 68% of the respondents 
would like to see the existing limited business relations between 
U.S. and the island either expanded or maintained. Half of Cuban 
Americans (50%) support opening up options for all Americans to 
invest in private enterprises on the island.
4Current U.S. immigration policies directed at Cubans receive support from some 
Cuban Americans, opposition from others. 
The termination of the “wet foot/dry foot” policy receives 
support from selected groups, but the population as a whole is 
evenly split on its support for the termination of the wet foot/dry 
foot policy with 52% supporting termination but the remainder 
either unsure (8%) or in opposition to its end (41%). Only the 
pre-1980 migrants and the second and third generations are 
significantly in favor of the abolition of this policy. Fifty-five percent 
of registered voters support the policy shift. 
5Cuban Americans in Miami-Dade County continue to have strong ties to friends and 
relatives on the island. 
Forty percent report sending money to friends and relatives 
and 36% report sending other items. Sending remittances is 
strongest among the new arrivals but traveling to the island is a 
broadly-based phenomenon. 
6While remaining staunchly Republican, (54%) younger Cuban Americans and 
new arrivals are fueling the ranks of the 
Independent and Democratic Parties. 
Yet, as the voting section shows, Republicans are still the ones 
that turn out and make a difference.
7A candidate’s position towards Cuba is  not a motivating factor in turning out the 
Cuban vote. 
Views on health care, the economy and jobs, gun control and 
even immigration issues are considered as more significant to 
Cuban Americans when evaluating a candidate.
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APPENDIX 1: 
Methodology
The FIU Cuba Poll has followed the same methodology over the two decades it has been conducted. 
Random digit dial (RDD) probability sampling is used to reach households, which are then screened for Cuban 
residents. No additional screening is done, although in earlier polls selection within the household for age 
and gender representativeness was done. Recently (including the current poll) the mix of landline and cell 
numbers made that unnecessary and Cuban Americans living in every part of the county have to have an equal 
probability of being selected. The questionnaire is always structured so that tracking questions occur in a 
similar context of questions asked before them year-to-year.  We consider this poll to be a serious conversation 
with Cuban-American residents of the county which is why questions that may elicit strong opinions need to be 
asked in context.
FIU contracted the services of NORS Surveys, Inc., to conduct telephone interviews among Cuban-American 
residents of Miami-Dade County. All calls were made from the NORS Surveys central phone location and were 
time-coded and maintained on computer database. For the current poll, 51,899 phone numbers were dialed 
from probability based Telephone Consumer Protection Act compliant samples purchased from Scientific 
Telephone Samples, resulting in 751 cell and 250 landline interviews. Approximately 5% of the calls reached 
a person in a household and 51% of those households responded to the screen for Cuban residents. Half 
of those screened identified as Cuban, 20% of whom completed the interview. All interviewers from NORS 
Surveys in Miami are bilingual, with both English and Spanish questionnaire versions on the Computer Assisted 
Telephone Interviewing (CATI) system, 69% of the interviews being completed in Spanish.
Results were weighted by Miami-Dade 2014-2016 American Community Survey (ACS) data on countywide 
age categories and gender for the Cuban population 18 years and older. This is standard practice in polling 
since men and women in different age groups have different probabilities of agreeing to be interviewed in a 
telephone survey. Younger males are somewhat more likely to complete a cell phone survey while the reverse 
is true for landline. Many households do not use landline phones at all, but on the other hand a number of older 
residents do not use cell phones.  The weights for the age and gender categories are shown below.
It should be noted that, while we use a weighting procedure the same as that of current highly rated political 
polls, these most accepted weighting procedures only go so far in estimating current opinions of a population 
on issues where one relatively small group of respondents has strongly different positions than the others.  This 
is the case with respondents to this poll who migrated to Miami-Dade before 1980 and are 76 years old or older. 
This group represents 16% of the poll sample and about 9% of the current Miami-Dade Cuban population 18 
years of age or older.
This difference can be seen if on the key embargo question two groups are compared: respondents who 
migrated from Cuba between 1959 and 1979 as opposed to all others (Figure 3.e above).  Differences in 
support for continuing the embargo are evident. We can be fairly confident in the estimates even though the 
groups differ in demographic composition because sample/census age and gender weighting are applied the 
same way to all three groups. 
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Weight Table
 Gender and Age Percent of 2018  Percent of Population Weight 
  Cuba Poll Persons of Cuban  
   Descent 18 and older  
   in Miami-Dade County  
   2014-2016 American  
   Community Survey
 Men 18-29 3% 8% 2.249
 Men 30-39 3% 7% 2.168
 Men 40-49 7% 9% 1.344
 Men 50-59 10% 9% 0.977
 Men 60-69 8% 7% 0.873
 Men 70-79 6% 6% 0.981
 Men 80 and older 4% 6% 1.619
 Women 18-29 3% 7% 2.771
 Women 30-39 4% 7% 1.922
 Women 40-49 10% 9% 0.986
 Women 50-59 11% 10% 0.907
 Women 60-69 13% 6% 0.428
 Women 70-79 12% 5% 0.428
 Women 80 and older 7% 3% 0.419
Men                      Women
 AGE Cell Landline Cell Landline
 18-39 15.6% 0.4% 10.6% 0 %
 40-59 36.5% 1.5% 30.1% 5.4%
 60-75 24.0% 6.6% 19.4% 10.4%
 76 & older 6.8% 8.5% 7.8% 16.4%
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1. Should unrestricted travel by all 
Americans to Cuba be allowed or not?
 Los viajes sin restricciones de todos 
los americanos a Cuba, ¿deberían ser 
permitidos o no?
2. Currently, any American can travel 
to Cuba in People-to-People 
trips designed to encourage 
communications among citizens 
of the U.S and citizens of Cuba. 
These trips are usually organized for 
educational, religious, or research 
purposes. Do you strongly favor, 
mostly favor, mostly oppose or 
strongly oppose this type of People to 
People travel?
 Actualmente, todo norteamericano 
puede viajar a Cuba por medio de viajes 
de pueblo a pueblo, organizados por 
agencias de viaje y diseñados para 
fomentar la comunicación entre los 
ciudadanos de los Estados Unidos y 
los ciudadanos de Cuba. ¿Está Ud. 
decididamente a favor, bastante a favor, 
bastante en contra, o fuertemente en 
contra de este tipo de viaje de pueblo  
a pueblo?
3. Overall, do you think the U.S. embargo 
of Cuba has worked very well, well, 
not very well, or not at all? 
 En términos generales, ¿cree usted que 
el embargo norteamericano a Cuba 
ha dado muy buen resultado, buen 
resultado, no muy buen resultado o 
ningún resultado?
4. Do you favor or oppose continuing the 
U.S. embargo of Cuba?
 ¿Está usted a favor o en contra de que 
continúe el embargo a Cuba?
5. Do you favor or oppose the U.S. 
reestablishing diplomatic relations 
with Cuba?
 ¿Está usted a favor o en contra del 
restablecimiento de las relaciones 
diplomáticas de los Estados Unidos  
con Cuba?
6. Over the past few years, people have 
been talking about the possibility of 
political changes in Cuba. When do 
you think that major political changes 
are likely to occur in Cuba? Would 
you say within one year, in two to 
five years, in six to ten years, over 
ten years, that change is already 
occurring, or never?
 Durante los últimos años se ha hablado 
sobre la posibilidad de cambios políticos 
en Cuba. ¿Cuándo cree usted que es 
probable que ocurran esos cambios 
políticos en Cuba? ¿Diría usted que 
dentro de un año, de dos a cinco años, 
de seis a diez años, más de diez años, o 
piensa usted que los cambios ya están 
ocurriendo o que nunca ocurrirán?
7. Some U.S. companies have managed 
to establish limited business relations 
with Cuba to sell grain, other 
agricultural products, and medicine. 
Should this kind of trade be expanded, 
kept the same or stopped?
 Algunas compañías en los Estados 
Unidos han logrado establecer 
relaciones limitadas para negociar 
con Cuba, vendiéndole granos, otros 
productos agrícolas y medicinas. 
¿Debería este comercio expandirse, 
mantenerse igual, o suspenderse?
8. First, allow companies to sell 
medicine to Cuba… Do you strongly 
favor, mostly favor, mostly oppose, or 
strongly oppose this?
 Permitir que las compañías vendan 
medicinas a Cuba, ¿está decididamente 
a favor, principalmente a favor, 
principalmente en contra, o fuertemente 
en contra?
9. Allowing U.S. companies to sell food 
to Cuba...Do you Strongly Favor, 
Mostly Favor, Mostly Oppose, or 
Strongly Oppose this?
 Permitir que las compañías 
norteamericanas vendan alimentos a 
Cuba... ¿Está decididamente a favor, 
principalmente a favor, principalmente 
en contra, o fuertemente en contra?
10. As it stands, all Cubans who enter 
the United States without the 
appropriate visa and do not qualify 
for humanitarian relief are sent back 
to Cuba. Do you agree or disagree 
with this policy?
 Hoy en día, todos los cubanos que 
entran a los Estados Unidos sin el 
visado apropiado y no califican para 
ayuda humanitaria son enviados de 
regreso a Cuba. ¿Está de acuerdo o en 
desacuerdo con esta política?
11. Should unrestricted travel by all 
Americans to Cuba be allowed or 
not?
 Los viajes sin restricciones de todos 
los americanos a Cuba ¿deberían ser 
permitidos o no?
12. Have you ever traveled to Cuba?
 ¿Ha viajado a Cuba alguna vez?
13. During the last few years the Cuban 
government has allowed more of 
its citizens to start their own small 
private businesses. Do you think 
people living in the US should be 
allowed to invest in these new 
independent small businesses  
in Cuba?
 Durante los últimos años, el 
gobierno cubano ha permitido que 
los ciudadanos inicien sus propias 
pequeñas empresas privadas. ¿Cree 
usted que a las personas viviendo en 
Estados Unidos se les debe permitir 
invertir en estos nuevos pequeños 
negocios privados en Cuba?
14. Would you invest in a private business 
in Cuba if given the opportunity? 
[asked only of respondents who  
said people living in the U.S should  
be allowed to invest in these  
new independent small businesses  
in Cuba?]
 ¿Invertiría usted en un negocio privado 
en Cuba si tuviera la oportunidad?
15. Are you registered as a Republican, 
a Democrat, an Independent, or with 
some other party? [asked only of 
respondents who were U.S. citizens 
and had registered to vote]
 ¿Está usted inscrito como republicano, 
demócrata, independiente o con algún 
otro partido?
16. Are you a U.S. citizen?
 ¿Es usted ciudadano norteamericano?
 
17. Are you registered to vote?
 ¿Está usted inscrito para votar?
18. Did you vote in the general election 
this month?
 ¿Voto en las elecciones generales de 
este mes?
19. In the election who did you vote for 
Governor?  [INTERVIEWER: DO NOT 
READ NAMES UNLESS NEEDED TO 
PROMPT]
 En la elección ¿por quién votó por 
gobernador?
Appendix 2: How Were The Questions Asked?
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About Florida International University
Florida International University, a public university located in Miami, has 
a passion for student success and community solutions. The university is 
classified by Carnegie as “R1.” FIU is among the top 100 public universities 
in U.S. News and World Report’s 2019 Best Colleges and 18 academic 
programs are individually ranked. FIU was recently ranked as the second best 
performing university in Florida and graduates are among the highest-paid in 
the state. FIU has multiple state-of-the-art research facilities including the Wall 
of Wind Research and Testing Facility and FIU’s Medina Aquarius Program.  
FIU has awarded more than 330,000 degrees since 1972 and enrolls more 
than 57,000 students in two campuses and centers including FIU Downtown 
on Brickell, FIU@I-75, the Miami Beach Urban Studios, and sites in Qingdao 
and Tianjin, China. FIU also supports artistic and cultural engagement through 
its three museums: Patricia & Phillip Frost Art Museum, the Wolfsonian-FIU, 
and the Jewish Museum of Florida-FIU. FIU is a member of Conference USA 
with more than 400 student-athletes participating in 18 sports. For more 
information about FIU, visit www.fiu.edu
About the Steven J. Green  
School of International and Public Affairs
Launched in 2008, the Steven J. Green School of International and Public 
Affairs at FIU educates the leaders and changemakers of tomorrow through 
innovative teaching and research that advances global understanding, 
contributes to policy solutions and promotes international dialogue. One of 
the largest schools of its kind in the world, the Green School enrolls more than 
7,200 students and employs 200 fulltime faculty. It offers 38 interdisciplinary 
degree programs at the bachelor’s, master’s and doctoral levels, as well 
as 35 undergraduate and graduate certificate programs. The Green School 
encompasses eight signature departments: Criminology and Criminal Justice, 
Economics, Global and Sociocultural Studies, History, Modern Languages, 
Politics and International Relations, Public Policy and Administration and 
Religious Studies. Home to 16 of the university’s most prominent international 
centers, institutes and programs, the Green School is an affiliate member of 
the Association of Professional Schools of International Affairs (APSIA). 
About the Cuban Research Institute
FIU’s Cuban Research Institute (CRI) is dedicated to creating and 
disseminating knowledge about Cuba and Cuban Americans. The institute 
encourages original research and interdisciplinary teaching, organizes 
extracurricular activities, collaborates with other academic units working in 
Cuban and Cuban-American studies, and promotes the development of library 
holdings and collections on Cuba and its diaspora. Founded in 1991, CRI is 
the nation’s premier center for research and academic programs on Cuban 
and Cuban-American issues. No other U.S. university surpasses FIU in the 
number of professors and students of Cuban origin.
20. In voting for the U.S. Congress House 
of Representatives, who did you 
vote for? [INTERVIEWER: DO NOT 
READ NAMES UNLESS NEEDED TO 
PROMPT]
 Al votar por la Cámara de 
Representantes del Congreso de los 
Estados Unidos, ¿por quién votó?
21. Who did you vote for U.S. Senator?  
[INTERVIEWER: DO NOT READ 
NAMES UNLESS NEEDED TO 
PROMPT]
 ¿Por quién votó por senador de los 
Estados Unidos?
22. Now let me list some issues that 
may have been important to you in 
your deciding who to vote for in the 
election. Please tell me which one or 
two of these items you considered 
most important in your decision: 
Health care, the economy and jobs, 
gun control, the candidate’s position 
on Cuba, taxes and spending, 
immigration, foreign policy, or 
terrorism. [asked only of respondents 
who had voted]
 Ahora permítame enumerar algunas 
cuestiones que pueden haber sido 
importantes para usted al decidir a 
quién votar en las elecciones. Por 
favor, dígame cuál fueron los dos 
temas que considero más importantes 
en su decisión: atención médica, la 
economía y el empleo, el control de 
las armas de fuego, la posición del 
candidato sobre las relaciones con 
Cuba, impuestos y gasto, inmigración, 
la política exterior, o el terrorismo u 
otro tema mas importante.
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